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Abstract 
To achieve the needed 95% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, almost all energy consumed globally will have 
to stem from low-carbon sources, not least from renewable energy. Sweden and Norway have long sought to 
become world environmental leaders, institutionalizing policies on environmental and climate issues as well as 
taking ambitious positions in the global climate negotiations. They are comparably well placed to become carbon-
neutral societies, with large renewable energy resources and substantial financial and institutional capacity to invest 
in reaching this target. Focusing on the production of new renewable energy in their energy system transformations 
from 1960 until the present, this paper investigates why the two countries have pursued such different paths, and 
what might be learned. The method used is the ‘most similar systems design’; data sources are public documents 
and 16 interviews with key persons in Sweden and Norway. The results show that politics and public policies have 
had profound impacts on which renewable energy sources have been developed, when and how. Sweden, lacking 
access to new cheap hydropower after 1970, has generally implemented more ambitious and comprehensive 
policies, leading to much higher production of new renewable energy than in Norway. Differences might thus be 
explained by differences in resource endowments, long-term research and innovation efforts, combined with 
creation of markets and predictable policies. Enhanced new renewables production has boosted energy security and 
stabilized the energy systems in both countries. The Swedish-Norwegian green certificate market has mainly 
contributed to expansion of already cost-competitive or nearly cost-competitive technologies: small-scale 
hydropower in Norway and biopower and wind power in Sweden. 
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1. Introduction 
More than two thirds of the world’s emissions of greenhouse gases stem from production and consumption of 
various types of energy [1]. Thus, large-scale world-wide energy system transformation is essential for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions to sustainable levels. Moreover, energy policy is one of the most thoroughly regulated 
areas in nation-states, and the state is the only authority with the legitimate means for changing the major patterns of 
energy production and consumption for its citizens. Therefore, national efforts at long-term large-scale 
transformation aimed at increasing national production and consumption of renewable energy, together with energy 
efficiency measures, are crucial. In other words, most countries need their own versions of the German 
Energiewende. Such transformation may not only be economically beneficial in terms of lower costs of energy and 
creation of new industries, but will also lead to improved energy security and better living environments [e.g. 2].  
Despite numerous similarities, Sweden and Norway have developed very different energy systems over the past 
50 years, not the least capacity for production from new renewable energy sources.† In the 20th century, Norway 
expanded production of its traditional source of electricity, hydropower, extensively, making it the largest 
hydropower producer in Europe. Sweden produces more renewable energy, in both absolute and relative terms, than 
Norway from all the other renewable power sources that are beyond the prototype stage in technological 
development [e.g. 3]‡. This paper undertakes a historical comparative analysis of renewable energy policies from 
1960 until the present to shed light on renewables policies in relation to energy system transformation. Both 
countries have achieved comparably large shares of renewable energy, with Sweden having more than 50% of 
energy domestically consumed from renewable energy and Norway about 64%. Now both seem to be struggling to 
transform their energy systems further, for example through decarbonizing the transport sectors, not least because 
future changes are expected to cost more than previous ones. The research question is:   
What might explain the large differences between the production of new renewable energy in Sweden and 
Norway, and what can we learn from this?  
 
2. Theory background 
The theory of historical institutionalism offers a relevant framework, for several reasons. First, it enables 
identification of critical junctures. Here comparative studies have the advantage that they may show how, for 
example, that some factors were decisive in one country and not the other for crucial decisions in energy policy [4]. 
Second, energy policy is a thoroughly regulated field in most countries, often involving decisions on investment 
with very long time horizons. Therefore, the institutional setting, in terms of both formal organizations and the 
informal rules under which they are created, is likely to be decisive [e.g. 5].  
As both Sweden and Norway have needed to expand their production of energy to cover increasing needs, 
including for electricity, it is natural to expect them to go for the ‘low-hanging fruits’ first. This means initially 
prioritizing the expansion of hydropower production, where the costs of production were very low and the resource 
potentials large. When this was no longer an option, we would expect them to use other types of viable energy 
where they have other sizable resource potentials, as with bioenergy. This leads to expectation 1:    
 
Physical resource potentials as well as the maturity of technologies influence the pace in expanding production from 
new renewables technologies. 
 
In the international literature on energy policy, crises in energy supply, fluctuating prices and nuclear accidents are 
typical external factors that strongly influence national energy policies [e.g. 6]. Such factors might lead countries to 
pursue policies more in line with the aims of creating an environmentally-friendly state and escaping ‘carbon lock-in’ 
[e.g. 7], such as investing in renewable energy production and consumption. This leads to expectation 2:  
  
                                                          
† ‘New renewable energy sources’ are all renewable energy sources apart from large-scale hydropower. Traditional bioenergy in the form of 
wood is not included in this term, as this is not a new source of energy.  
‡
 Please contact the author if you have questions about the references. Several could not be included in the text.  
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External shocks, such as crises in energy supply, nuclear accidents and major fluctuations in petroleum and other 
energy prices have had decisive effects on Swedish and Norwegian policies, making politicians and polities aware of 
the risks associated with current policies and giving them incentives to promote production from new renewable 
sources. 
 
As the EU has wanted to be a world environmental leader, and has increasingly put more emphasis on climate-
related issues such as expansion of renewable energy [e.g. 8, 9], it is to be expected that Sweden, as an EU member, 
will be more influenced by the EU than non-member Norway in the sphere of climate and energy policy. This leads 
to expectation 3:  
 
Membership in international organizations (here: the EU) has influenced levels of ambitiousness in renewable energy 
policy in EU-Sweden, but not to the same extent in EEA-Norway. 
3. Method 
The method of ‘most similar systems design’ will be employed. This method is used to compare cases that ideally 
are similar on all variables except for one, and have different outcomes on the dependent variable [10]. All similar 
independent variables can therefore be eliminated except for the one or the few where the cases differ. These 
remaining variable(s) are therefore expected to explain the outcome on the dependent variable [11]. Eliminating 
irrelevant variables is thus used as a strategy to enable a more focused analysis. This study is based on a wide range 
of sources, including 16 semi-structured interviews with key respondents in Sweden and in Norway (see Appendix). 
In order to get comparable interviews as regards organizations, respondents were selected fairly symmetrically from 
Sweden and Norway so that the ministries in charge, regulating bodies, umbrella interest organizations of energy 
producers, and interest organizations of wind and bioenergy would all be represented.  
4. Similarities between Sweden and Norway 
From a macro-perspective, Sweden and Norway are about as similar as is possible according to standards of 
comparative country research. First, their governments have similar official political aims in policies that typically 
stimulate growth in renewables – high climate ambitions [e.g. 12-14], boosting energy security through increased 
domestic production of renewable energy, and being world leaders in innovation and entrepreneurship [e.g. 15, 16]. 
Second, to expand renewables production on a large scale, an ample resource base is needed. Both countries are well 
endowed with renewable energy sources, with large potentials for hydropower, wind power and biomass power [e.g. 
17-22]. Third, their electricity supply systems share several features, including the role of the former monopolists 
Vattenfall and Statkraft.    
Fourth, renewable energy production in both Sweden and Norway is subject to the influence of EU energy 
policies, in particular through the EU Renewable Energy Directive (Directive 2009/28 EC, the Renewables 
Directive). On 1st January 2012, Norway and Sweden launched a common certificate market in order to achieve the 
national renewables targets stated in the Renewables Directive, which requires Sweden to enhance its share of 
domestically consumed renewable energy from 39.8% in 2005 to 49% by 2020, while Norway must increase it from 
58.2% in 2005 to 67.5% by 2020 [23-26]. Within 2020, the two countries are to add on a total of 26.4 TWh of 
electricity from renewable sources together. The price for this increase will be paid equally by the consumers. New 
renewables projects will thus be located where it pays off the most to invest, regardless of country [25, 26].   
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5. Analysis: What might explain the large differences between energy systems in Sweden and in Norway, and 
what can we learn?§ 
The analysis shows that the Swedish and Norwegian governments clearly have kept resource potentials in mind 
when deciding on policies to promote bioenergy (Sweden), and electrify the country and also use electricity for 
heating (Norway). For Norway, electricity from hydropower was a potentially very large and abundant source. Still, 
it was not clear that this would be the single dominant source of electric power in the early 1970s. It was only when 
popular protests made nuclear energy extremely contentious, analyses showed potentials for further expansion of 
hydro power and after the Three Mile Island accident that the government decided to not allow construction of 
nuclear reactors in Norway. Sweden’s sizeable development of bioenergy has come about as a result of various 
factors over several decades, including sustained R&D efforts, creation of markets through fossil fuel taxation, and 
constructing extensive district heating systems. In Norway, having access to abundant and cheap hydroelectric 
power has made other renewable energy sources relatively expensive in comparison. Thus, without extra support 
mechanisms and other types of stimulating measures, such energy production has not been enhanced. The need for 
such ‘pull-factors’ to expand production from new renewable sources has been pointed out by Gross et al. [27].  
Both Sweden and Norway have set aside significant resources for research on renewable energy. However, the 
Swedish authorities, lacking the same access to new cheap hydropower, have seemingly launched far more wide-
reaching, extensive and long-lasting support programmes for various types of renewable energy. These ‘pull-factors’ 
have ultimately also contributed to much greater penetration of new renewables sources than in Norway, particularly 
in the case for bioenergy. With technology expansion, this up-scaling has pressed down the prices for installation 
and other parts of the supply chains, bringing lower costs as regards, for example, wind energy than in Norway. 
Thus, energy system transformation may require a host of different types of regulatory measures as well as various 
support mechanisms and expansion of relevant infrastructure such as electricity grids.  
What at any moment is costly or less costly in a market will depend on several circumstances. For example with 
steep projected cost digression curves for photovoltaic energy technology [28], Norwegians might in the future 
choose to install integrated solar systems when solar rooftops become commercially viable and cheap, although this 
option might seem unrealistic today. Interview data also show another factor that might be decisive for investment is 
regulatory stability, giving investors the safety and motivation to invest in renewables projects. Otherwise, many 
investors will probably not take the risks involved in investing in new renewable energy projects. Sweden seems to 
have had larger regulatory stability in its renewables policies from the 2000s onwards, while changing policies, 
particularly as regards wind power support, has made Norwegian investors sceptical.     
The analysis also gives support to expectation number 2. The oil crises of 1973 and -79 can be viewed as typical 
external shocks. They influenced Norwegian and Swedish energy policies in the 1970s, leading to more research on 
alternative energy sources such as various types of renewable energy and other measures to enhance energy security. 
In Sweden, this was also a major motivation to stimulate long-term programmes to promote bioenergy, while in 
Norway it motivated the promotion of large-scale substitution from oil-fuelled heating systems to electric heating. 
Nuclear accidents around the world can also be classified as external shocks.  
The Three Mile Island accident of 1979 seems to have contributed to the final decision never to build nuclear 
power in Norway, and was the prima facie reason for the Swedish government’s decision to hold a referendum on 
the use of nuclear power in 1980. The 1986 Chernobyl accident greatly increased Swedish nuclear resentment and 
motivation for alternative sources of electricity. Later events that may be perceived as ‘crises’ – the periods of high 
electricity prices in 1997 and 2001 in Norway – stimulated the establishment of energy-efficiency programmes, 
improved cross-border electricity trade and investment in developing alternative means of energy supply. These 
periods were thus important for the Norwegian government’s motivation to establish Enova, which promoted 
alternative energy sources, including wind power and heat pumps. Such crises opened windows of opportunity for 
politicians and other political engineers who had wanted to change the energy systems, providing legitimacy to 
introduce targeted support mechanisms for renewable energy. The Fukushima accident, however, seems to have had 
little impact in Sweden and in Norway, in contradiction to several other European countries.  
                                                          
§
 Only the analysis is included in this paper, due to the Energy Procedia length restrictions. Please contact the author if you have questions about 
the data that the analysis is based upon.  
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Internationally, a major driving force of renewable energy is seemingly creation of domestic industries that 
provide workplaces. However, with very low rates of unemployment in Norway in recent decades, this argument has 
not carried much weight for Norwegian decision makers. When oil and gas prices were falling and it seemed that the 
oil reservoirs in the North Sea would soon be depleted, greater attention was paid to offshore wind in particular as a 
source of industrial opportunities. However, discoveries of new petroleum fields led to less attention and investment 
in offshore wind [29]. In Sweden, the job market argument has been used by policy makers several times, for 
example in the decisions to stimulate increased use of bioenergy in the 1980s and onwards.  
Still, crises are not the only factors that have been decisive for changes in national energy policies. Various 
measures have been crucially influenced by the political decision makers in government, as when Norwegian Prime 
Minister Jens Stoltenberg (and his government) abandoned plans for green certificate schemes with Sweden in 2005, 
and his decision that no major new river systems should be dammed up for hydropower production. National energy 
policies are thus inherently political in nature, and energy-related crises can provide national decision makers with a 
window of opportunity to choose different paths, including ‘greener’ ones.  
The interview data also give some support to our expectation no. 3. Some respondents mentioned that the EU had 
made Sweden’s climate and energy policies more ambitious in general. Norway, as an EEA member, is also affected 
by EU policies in this field, as shown when Norway implemented its first support mechanism for renewable energy 
when the EU Renewables Directive had to be implemented. Still, unsurprisingly, EU influence on Sweden as 
regards renewables appears to have been greater than in the case of Norwegian renewables policies, and has 
probably made Swedish energy policies somewhat more ambitious. On the other hand, Sweden has had national 
targets that were higher than those outlined in, for example, the EU Renewables Directive and that have already 
been achieved and even exceeded. The data also show that Sweden’s more rapid expansion in new renewable 
energies has been caused by broader sets of implemented measures, including higher support rates, more regulatory 
certainty and more consistent political signals over time, than in Norway, particularly the last decade. 
6. Conclusions 
The analysis supports all three presented hypotheses. First, governments have historically taken domestic 
resource endowments and technological maturity into consideration when developing national energy system. For 
example, when strongly needing more energy from the 1960s onwards, the Norwegian governments supported 
building out hydropower. The Swedish mainly opted for bioenergy when they could no longer build out their hydro 
resources.  
Second, international energy crisis have impacted the politics and policies in both countries. The analysis 
identifies four crises that have impacted on political will and then policies to stimulate renewables developments in 
Sweden and in Norway; The oil crises of the 1970s led especially to increased efforts in research and development, 
but also to programmes for fuel switching in Sweden. The 1979 Three Miles Island accident impacted on the final 
Norwegian governmental decision to stay away from nuclear power, while there was a referendum in Sweden in 
1980 due to the further increased controversy. Moreover, the Chernobyl accident of 1986 motivated further political 
support for bioenergy policies in Sweden. Finally the ‘electricity crises’ in 1997 and 2001 and the popular protest 
against the unstable and high electricity prices gave Norwegian policy makers the motivation to establish Enova, the 
first public Norwegian body to give support to renewable energy production.  
Third, the analysis shows that the EU membership has contributed somewhat to making Sweden more ambitious 
in its policies on renewable energy than non-member Norway.   
We cannot know what the demand for energy will look like in the future. Rapid technological change might put 
especially Norway at a disadvantage, as so much of the economy is linked to its petroleum sector, which might be 
perceived as a typical energy system lock-in. The petroleum industry also possesses considerable structural power to 
influence decision making in its own interests, possibly obstructing a shift to a more sustainable society.  
Take the internet revolution: a technological breakthrough previously unimaginable. Yergin [30] comments:  
 
There is no question that we are at a turning point in world energy. But then we are often at a turning point. Just as 
everybody gets comfortable with what they expect to happen, a big change comes along that undercuts existing 
assumptions. 
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Many changes in energy systems will probably not come about without stimulation of various kinds, as noted by 
several analysts and business representatives. While we may hope for the best in terms of technological changes, the 
paper has shown that changes in this heavily regulated field have often come about through government 
interventions. Exactly how Norway and Sweden should change their energy systems is not obvious, as there are 
numerous pathways to sustainable energy systems. One thing seems clear: in order to increase renewable energy 
production and consumption, general measures to stimulate research, in combination with the creation of 
commercial domestic markets to bridge the technological ‘valley of death’, and long-term regulatory stability, will 
remain essential. Only comprehensive measures will lead to the needed energy system transformation.   
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Astrup, Nikolai. Høyre (Norwegian conservative party), Norway 
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Ebenå, Gustav. Energimyndigheten (Swedish Energy Agency), Sweden 
Flatby, Rune. Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat (NVE) (Norwegian Energy Resources and Water Directorate), 
Norway 
Fredriksson, Gunnar. Svensk Energi (Swedish Energy), Sweden  
Hegg Gundersen, Mari. Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat (NVE) (Norwegian Energy Resources and Water 
Directorate), Norway  
Hersvik, Rune. Norsk vind (Norwegian Wind), Norway  
Hjørnegård, Sigrid. Energi Norge (Energy Norway), Norway 
Holm, Marius. Zero, Norway 
Isachsen, Øyvind. Norwea, Norway 
Johansen, Øivind. Olje og energidepartementet (OED) (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy), Norway  
Kåberger, Thomas. Chalmers University; former CEO in Energimyndigheten (Swedish Energy Agency), Sweden 
Leistad, Øyvind. Enova, Norway 
Olesen, Johanna. Svensk vindenergi (Swedish Wind Energy), Sweden 
Pedersen, Carl-Arne. Svensk vindenergi (Swedish Wind Energy), Sweden    
 
